Why nationalism

For example, M. Walzer , chapter four , stresses the role of fear and insecurity in producing extremist attitudes, apparently taking them to make the attitudes understandable, if not excusable.

This captures precisely the validity and limits of the excuse: it is valid only in situations of direct serious threat, and it stops being valid the moment the threat is removed.

What Walzer forgets to add is that the threat itself is most often again a nationalist one: at the beginning of each justified nationalistic move, there is an unjustified one from the opposite side, most often. But then, the advocate of nationalism has no right to use this kind of example to condemn universalism, and to extol the virtues of the nation: it was nationalism against nationalism from the very beginning.

Now, the most typical kind of nationalism is the invidious variant, for reasons that are far from accidental. Partiality and universalization make for strange bedfellows, as has often been noted in the literature. The non-invidious variant introduces an enormous complication: if you believe in it you have to believe, on the one hand, that your nation is somehow better, morally preferable, endowed with a more attractive culture for you , but that others, who are not your co-nationals, should justifiably believe exactly the same thing about cultures that you find less attractive, and so on.

This tension between spontaneous attachment and reflective readiness to see all communities with an equal eye makes the non-invidious position psychologically unstable, and hard to uphold in situations of conflict. This psychological weakness is likely to make it politically less effective.

This brings us directly to the next point. I have just mentioned the internal tension between the universality of the non-invidious variant all should struggle for their own nation!

The sad reality of competition makes the non-invidious variant difficult to uphold in practice. No wonder: suppose I am persuaded by the non-invidious but tough ideologist that I have to fight for my people, persuade my wife to have five kids for the benefit of our fatherland, and dedicate myself to my ethnic roots not to mention such subtle things as listening for the most part to the music of composers of my ethno-nation , and that each member of any nation should do the same things for his or her people.

Suddenly, I discover that in the very midst of my country there is a community that simply does not fit into the picture: they speak a different dialect, have a different religion, and show no enthusiasm for my project, for which I am ready to die. Perhaps I can summon some abstract understanding of their situation, but in the actual struggle they will appear as just another bunch of foreigners, inimical to our noble purpose.

With the enemy seen as the devil himself, it is difficult to preserve a universalizing attitude. It relies upon the same false assumptions— i , ii , and iii —as the invidious kind.

By giving primacy to unchosen belonging it sins against autonomy. By preaching the duty of partiality it adds an additional difficulty. Justice as impartiality is meant to solve conflicts and make possible cohabitation. Once group partiality reigns, every group will reasonably want its own set of political institutions, and we will end up with the nasty variant. So the non-invidious variant, as presented in theory and in a relatively cautious form, is still not morally in the clear.

The usual applications of the variant are obviously and dramatically immoral. Take the rights of individual women, if you need a reminder.

The ultra-moderate variant does not present a clearly nationalist political or cultural program at all.

To the extent that it is morally in the clear it is not nationalist, and to the extent it is nationalist it is not morally in the clear. We have already documented the problems for the ultra-moderate, liberal nationalist line.

Let me briefly recall that ultra-moderate defenders of pro-nationalist attitudes do not offer clear long-term political guidelines. We have discussed authors that explicitly call themselves liberal nationalists. Let me in addition mention M.

Walzer, who does not do so, but who nevertheless defends a particularism of nations. He sometimes bravely states that self-determination involving secession is the paradigmatic form of his moral program of a particularistic universalism Walzer, , and his general political advice is to let each nation that wants to go its own way do so.

But federation is not what secession preserves, but what it normally destroys. I am pointing to these internal tensions not in order to criticize Walzer, but to document once more the internal weaknesses of the ultra-moderate variant. It nicely illustrates the first part of my basic claim about it: to the extent that it is morally in the clear it is not nationalist.

Walzer, D. Why Nationalism is an important contribution to this growing literature. Not a defense of Trumpian politics but a measured explanation of why the American populace was so receptive to both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. Yael Tamir brings a better and more thoughtful understanding of nationalism to bear on this hot topic than most other contributors.

This is a useful book for readers perplexed by contemporary politics and looking for a guide. Due to global supply chain issues, book orders are currently taking days or longer to be delivered.

Please order early for the holidays or consider shopping at your local bookstore. Yael Tamir Why nationalism is a permanent political force—and how it can be harnessed once again for liberal ends.

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Part I: The Return of History.